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Introduction
It has become commonplace to claim that political disagreements can be traced to a "clash of narratives". Going beyond differences in preferences or information, divergent opinions emanate from fundamentally different interpretations of reality that take the form of stories. Consequently, a policy gains in popularity if it can be sustained by an effective narrative; and politicians and public-opinion makers spend considerable energy on trying to shape the popular narratives that surround policy debates.
There are countless expressions of this idea in popular and academic discourse. For instance, a recent New Yorker profile of a former aide of President Obama begins with the words "Barack Obama was a writer before he became a politician, and he saw his Presidency as a struggle over narrative".
1 Likewise, two public policy professors write in an LSE blog that "there can be little doubt then that people think narratives are important and that crafting, manipulating, or influencing them likely shapes public policy". They add that narratives simplify complex policy issues "by telling a story that
includes assertions about what causes what, who the victims are, who is causing the harm, and what should be done".
2
In this paper we offer a formalization of the idea that battles over public opinion involve competing narratives. Of course, the term "narrative" is vague and any formalization inevitably leaves many of its aspects outside the scope of investigation. Our model is based on the idea that in the context of public-policy debates, narratives can be regarded as causal models that map actions to consequences. Following the literature on probabilistic graphical models in Statistics, Artificial Intelligence and Psychology (Cowell et al. (1999) , Sloman (2005) , Pearl (2009)), we represent such causal models by directed acyclic graphs (DAGs).
In our model, what defines a narrative is the variables it incorporates and the way these are arranged in the causal mapping from actions to consequences. For instance, consider a debate over US trade policy and its possible 1 See https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/witnessing-the-obamapresidency-from-start-to-finish. 2 See http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2018/07/18/mastering-the-art-of-the-narrative-using-stories implications for employment in the local manufacturing sector. Suppose that the public has homogenous preferences over actions and consequences; disagreements only arise from different beliefs. The DAG trade policy → imports from China → employment (1) represents a narrative that weaves a third variable (imports from China) into a causal story that regulates the action-consequence mapping which is the subject of the policy debate.
The nodes in the DAG represent variables (not the values they can take), and the links represent perceived direct causal effects (but not the sign or magnitude of these effects). The variables are coarse-grained, such that the narrative does not describe an individual historical episode; instead, it can be used to interpret a wealth of historical episodes. It alerts the public's attention to long-run correlations between adjacent variables along the causal chain and invites a causal interpretation of these correlations.
We refer to the narrative represented by (1) as a "lever narrative" because it regards imports from China as a "lever" -i.e., as an endogenous variable that is influenced by policy and in turn influences the target variable. Intuitively, this narrative supports a protectionist policy: imports from China are negatively correlated with both protectionism and employment in the local manufacturing sector, and it is natural to interpret these correlations in terms of the causal chain (1) . But while the support is intuitive, it is illusory if the narrative is false -e.g. if the actual correlation between imports from China and employment is due to the confounding effect of exogenous technological change.
The following is another example of a lever narrative in the context of a foreign policy debate. The policy question is whether to impose economic sanctions on a rival country with a hostile regime. The public considers destabilizing the regime a desirable outcome. A lever narrative that intuitively gives support to a hawkish policy is sanction policy → economic situation in rival country → regime stability
The following is a lever narrative that involves a different "lever": sanction policy → nationalism in rival country → regime stability This narrative intuitively supports a dovish policy because nationalistic sentiments in the rival country are positively correlated with the stability of its regime and potentially ameliorated by a soft stance on sanctions.
Thus, two narratives may have the same "lever" structure but differ in the selection of variables that function as "levers", and consequently in the policies they support. Likewise, the same variable can be assigned different roles in the causal scheme. For instance, the following is a foreign-policy narrative that treats nationalism as an exogenous variable: sanction policy → regime stability ← nationalism in rival country
We refer to a narrative with this structure as a "threat/opportunity narrative", because it regards the third variable that it weaves into the story as an external variable that the policy responds to rather than influences it. In the context of our foreign-policy example, this narrative intuitively favors a hawkish policy because it regards the prospect of waning nationalism in the rival country as an opportunity for toppling its regime, which tough sanction policy can exploit.
Thus, foreign-policy narratives can differ in the variables they weave into the story or in the role that these variables play in the causal mapping from actions to consequences. This is akin to a dramatist's decision about which events to include as ingredients in a story and how to construct a plot around them. Different narratives can generate different beliefs regarding the mapping from actions to consequences -and therefore lend support to different policies -because they alert the audience's attention to correlations between different sets of variables and manipulate its causal interpretation of these correlations. A public-opinion maker who wishes to promote a particular policy will therefore devise a narrative that "sells" it most effectively. Our objective is to define a notion of equilibrium in public-policy debates, in which narrative-policy pairs vie for dominance in public opinion. When the public adopts a narrative, we assume -following Spiegler (2016) -that it constructs a belief over the narrative's variables, by factorizing their objective joint distribution according to the so-called "Bayesian-Network factorization formula", and it relies on this belief to evaluate policies. This factorization captures the notion of fitting the causal model to objective data. A wrong causal model can induce a distorted belief regarding the mapping from actions to consequences.
To summarize the first ingredient of our model, a narrative is an arrangement of selected variables in a causal model (formalized as a DAG), combined with a rule for generating beliefs from such a causal model. But what happens when the public confronts competing narratives? Here we invoke the second ingredient of our model, which is the idea that the public selects between narrative-policy pairs "hedonically" -i.e., according to the indirect anticipatory utility that each one of them generates.
The idea that people adopt distorted beliefs to enhance their anticipatory utility has several precedents in the literature (Akerlof and Dickens 1982), Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) , Spiegler (2008) ). Recently, Montiel Olea et al. (2018) studied the notion of "competing models" in a very different context of linear regression models that differ in the set of variables they admit, and assumed that prevailing models maximize the indirect expected utility they induce when estimated against a random sample. In the context of public-policy debates, we find it particularly natural to assume that the public will be drawn to hopeful narrative-policy pairs. Precisely because individuals have little influence over public policy, they incur negligible decision costs when indulging in hopeful fantasies. It is therefore realistic to assume that anticipatory feelings are a powerful driving force behind political positions.
Based on these two ingredients, we define equilibrium as a steady-state distribution over narrative-policy pairs, such that every element in the support maximizes a representative agent's anticipatory utility. Why we do refer to this concept as "equilibrium" instead of plain maximization? The reason is that the action frequencies that are induced by a given distribution over narrative-policy pairs can affect belief (and hence the anticipatory utility) that each narrative generates. This feedback effect is fundamental to the idea of beliefs that are generated by fitting a wrong causal model to objective long-run data (see Spiegler (2016) ), and it is what creates the need for an equilibrium approach to the notion of competing narratives.
We employ our equilibrium concept to explore several questions: Which narratives are attached to various policies -that is, what is their causal structure and what kind of variables do they involve? Can we account for divergent popular policies by the notion of competing narratives? Are swings between conflicting dominant narratives fundamental to battles over public opinion?
The results we present demonstrate the formalism's potential to shed light on the role of narratives in political debates.
Related literature
The idea that people think about empirical regularities in terms of "causal stories" that can be represented by DAGs has been embraced by psychologists of causal reasoning (e.g. Sloman (2005) , Sloman and Lagnado (2015) ).
Spiegler (2016) adopted this idea as a basis for a model of decision making under causal misperceptions. In Spiegler (2016), a decision maker forms a subjective belief by fitting a subjective causal model to objective long-run data. This continues to be a building block of the model in this paper, which goes beyond it in two major directions: first, the collection of variables that can appear in a causal model of a given size is not fixed but selected endogenously; and second, we assume "hedonic" selection between competing causal models.
We are aware of at least three papers in economics that draw attention to the role of narratives in economic contexts. Given that the term "narrative" has such a loose meaning, it should come as no surprise that it has received very different formalizations. Shiller (2017) does not provide an explicit model of what a narrative is. Instead, he regards certain terms and expressions that appear in popular discourse as indications of a specific narrative and proposes to use epidemiological models to study their spread. Benabou et al. (2016) focus on moral decision making and formalize narratives as messages or signals that can affect decision makers' beliefs regarding the ex-ternality of their actions. Levy and Razin (2018) use the term "narrative" to describe information structures in game-theoretic settings that people postulate to explain observed behavior.
Finally, our paper joins a handful of works in so-called "behavioral political economics" that study voters' belief formation according to misspecified subjective models or wrong causal attribution rules -e.g., Spiegler (2013) , Esponda and Pouzo (2017) ; and see Schnellenbach and Schubert (2015) for a survey.
The Model
Let X = X 1 × · · · × X n , where n > 2 and X i = {0, 1} for each i = 1, ..., n.
For every N ⊆ {1, ..., n}, denote X N = × i∈N X i . For any x ∈ X, the components x 1 and x n -also denoted a and y -are referred to as an action and a consequence. These components are independently distributed. In particular, actions have no causal effects on consequences.
Let Q be a finite set of conditional distributions over x 2 , ..., x n−1 that have full support for every x 1 , x n . Given a pair of numbers α, µ ∈ (0, 1), define P α,µ ⊂ ∆(X) as the set of distributions p for which p(a = 1) = α, p(y = 1 | a) = µ for all a, and (p(· | x 1 , x n )) is in Q. We regard µ as a constant, whereas α represents a historical action frequency that we endogenize below. A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is a pair (N, R), where N ⊆ {1, ..., n} is a set of nodes and R ⊆ N × N is a set of directed links. Acyclicity means that the graph contains no directed path from a node to itself. We use iRj or i → j to denote a directed link from the node i into the node j. Abusing notation, let R(i) = {j ∈ N | jRi} be the set of "parents" of node i. We will often suppress N in the notation of a DAG and identify it with R.
Following Pearl (2009), we interpret a DAG as a causal model, where the link i → j means that x i is perceived as an immediate cause of x j .
Directedness and acyclicity of R are consistent with basic intuitions regarding causality. The causal model is agnostic about the sign or magnitude of causal effects.
Let R be a collection of DAGs (N, R) satisfying two restrictions: {1, n} ⊆ N, and there is no directed path from n to 1 -i.e., the consequence variable is not perceived as a (possibly indirect) cause of the action. In all the DAGs that appear in the examples we will examine, 1 is an ancestral node (i.e., R(1) = ∅) and n is the unique terminal node (i.e., n / ∈ R(i) for every i ∈ N and there is no other node with this property). However, these properties are not necessary for our general analysis.
Narratives and their induced beliefs
Fix α, µ ∈ (0, 1). A narrative is a pair s = (p, R) ∈ P α,µ × R. The narrative induces a subjective belief over ∆(X N ), defined as follows:
The full-support assumption ensures that all the terms in this factorization formula are well-defined.
The conditional distribution of x n given x 1 induced by p R is computed in the usual way. It has a simple expression when 1 is an ancestral node:
For illustration, when the DAG is R : 1 → 3 → 4 ← 2, the narrative (p, R) induces
The interpretation of this belief formation process is as follows. In a narrative (p, R), the conditional distribution p(x 2 , ..., x n−1 | x 1 , x n ) represents a selection of n − 2 observable variables that are incorporated into the story.
In other words, every conditional distribution in Q is implemented by some collection of n − 2 actual variables. The component R determines how these variables (some or all of them) are woven into a causal structure. This is akin to a novelist who conjures up a collection of events, and then organizes their unfolding according to a plot. The narrative generates a subjective belief regarding the mapping from actions to consequences, by alerting the audience's attention to particular correlations -those that the causal model deems relevant -and combining them according to the causal model. The correlations themselves are accurate -i.e., each of the terms in the factorization formula (2) is extracted from an objective distribution (over a, y and the selected additional variables). However, the way they are combined may lead to distorted belief, such that p R (y = 1 | a) = µ for some a.
Policies and anticipatory utility
proposed mixture over actions, where d is the proposed frequency of playing the action a = 1.
Given a historical action frequency α, a narrative s = (p, R) and a policy d induce the following gross anticipatory utility:
Note that V is defined for a given α because the set of feasible narratives varies with α, but also (as we will later see) because the subjective distribu-
where d * ∈ D is the agent's ideal policy, and C is a symmetric, convex cost function that satisfies C(0) = C ′ (0) = 0. The function C represents the agent's intrinsic disutility he experiences when deviating from his ideal policy. Note that if the agent had rational expectations, he would realize that y is independent of a and find no reason to deviate from d * . Given α,
The agent's net anticipatory utility from the narrative-policy pair (s, d) is
One may wonder why there is a need to define policy as a continuous variable, rather than identifying it with the binary action. The reason, as usual in these cases, is that we want our model to generate a fine mapping from the subjective belief p R (y | a) to policies. In addition, certain interesting effects in our model would disappear or become obscured under a binarypolicy specification.
Equilibrium
The model's primitives are the exogenous probability of a good outcome µ, the set of conditional distributions Q, the set of feasible DAGs R and the cost function C. The objects P α,µ , p R and U are derived from these primitives.
We are now ready to define our notion of equilibrium.
Definition 1 An action frequency α ∈ [0, 1] and a probability distribution σ over narrative-policy pairs constitute an equilibrium if two conditions hold:
This concept captures a steady-state in the battle over public opinion.
The first condition requires that prevailing narrative-policy pairs are those that maximize the representative agent's net anticipatory utility, given the historical action frequency. Thus, public opinion's criterion for selecting between competing narrative-policy pairs is net anticipatory utility -in other words, it chooses the narrative it prefers to believe in. This captures the idea that voters do not adjudicate between narratives using "scientific" methods; rather, they are attracted to narratives with a hopeful message. The second condition requires the historical action frequency to be consistent with the marginal steady-state distribution over policies. The lower and upper limits on d are thus introduced in order to ensure that α is interior.
The distribution α can be interpreted as a cross-section measurement of the relative popularity of various policies among the public. However, we favor an "ergodic" interpretation, according to which α describes a historical action frequency. Different policies are ascendant at various points in time.
A particular policy rises to dominance when the narrative that accompanies it appeals to the public in the sense that the narrative-policy pair maximizes the public's anticipatory payoff. Over time, as the historical action frequency changes, so does the anticipatory payoff induced by various narrative-policy pairs, and therefore a different narrative-policy pair may become dominant. The distribution α is the average action frequency that results from the periodic swings between dominant narrative-policy pairs.
The following preliminary result establishes equilibrium existence.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium exists.
Our next basic observation provides a simple rational-expectations benchmark. If R is a fully connected DAG, or if it contains no directed path from the ancestral node 1 to node n, then p R (y | a) = µ for all a -i.e. the agent's belief regarding the mapping from actions to consequences coincides with rational expectations. In this case,
deviating from the ideal policy d * does not produce any kick to anticipatory utility. If R only consists of such DAGs, then in any equilibrium (α, σ), the marginal of σ over d (and therefore α) assigns probability one to d * . In the next section, we will begin to see departures from this crisp benchmark when other DAGs are admitted.
3 An Example: Foreign-Policy Narratives
. Take ε (in the definition of D) to be vanishingly small. Suppose that Q consists of a single conditional distribution:
The approximate equality is due to an arbitrarily small perturbation of the exact specification x 2 = a(1 − y), to ensure that p has full support. The set R consists of all DAGs with two or three nodes in which a is represented by a ancestral node.
Interpret the three variables as follows. The action a represents foreign policy toward a rival country with a hostile regime, where a = 1 (0) denotes hawkish (dovish) policy. The consequence y represents the stability of the regime, where y = 1 (0) indicates regime change (regime stability). Finally, the variable x 2 represents the strength of nationalistic attitudes among the rival country's population, where x 2 = 1 (0) indicates that these attitudes are strong (weak).
The joint distribution p satisfies the following properties. First, foreign policy has no causal effect on the stability of the rival country's regime. Second, hawkish (dovish) policy tends to strengthen (weaken) nationalism in the rival country. Finally, nationalism and regime stability are positively correlated. In particular, regime change can only happen when nationalistic attitudes are weak. Yet, this correlation is not causal; rather, it is due to confounding by exogenous variables that are excluded from the causal models our narrators employ.
Since Q is a singleton in this example, narrators have no freedom in their choice of p. Consequently, a narrative can be identified with the DAG it employs.
Claim 1 There exists a unique equilibrium (α, σ), where α ≈ 2 − √ 2 and Supp(σ) consists of two narrative-policy pairs: (i) a lever narrative R l :
Proof. For the sake of the calculations in this proof, we treat the approximateequality definition of p as if the equality were precise. We will also suppose that the equilibrium policies are interior and given by first-order conditions. We will later verify that the equilibrium is unique.
Consider the opportunity DAG R o . By (3), we have
We can calculate these terms under the specification (6) and the assumption that µ = 1 2 , and obtain
Therefore,
Because this derivative is strictly positive at d ≤ and strictly decreasing in
, there is a unique policy
Now consider the lever DAG R l . By (3), we have
Because this derivative is strictly negative at d ≥ and strictly decreasing in d > 1 2 , there is a unique policy
Let us first suppose that Supp(σ) coincides with this set and that d o and d l are given by first-order conditions. Then,
By plugging (7)- (10) into the above equations, we can verify that they are satisfied at the values for (d o , d l , α) that are given in the statement of the claim. The assumption on k ensures that the solution is well-defined. The exact weights that σ assigns to the two points in the support can be extracted from the condition α
To verify uniqueness, consider first equilibria in which Supp(σ) has two
monotonically increases with α. This means that for a given
, there is a unique α that solves equation (11) . Given α, equations (11)- (12) 
This example has a number of noteworthy features.
Coupling of narratives and policies
Although there is a single available variable (other than the action and the consequence) that narrators can incorporate into their stories, its location in the narrative's causal scheme depends on the direction of the policy the narrative is meant to sustain. Thus, in order to sustain a hawkish policy d > d * , the narrative must treat the variable x 2 as an exogenous opportunity.
In contrast, to sustain a dovish policy d < d * , the narrative must treat the variable x 2 as a lever. The reason that the lever narrative promotes dovish policies is that according to p, a and x 2 are positively correlated, whereas x 2 and y are neg-atively correlated. The lever narrative puts these correlations together as if they reflected a causal chain a → x 2 → y. As a result, p R l predicts a negative indirect causal effect of a on y.
The intuition for why the opportunity narrative promotes hawkish policies is quite different. According to p, Pr(a = 1, x 2 = 0) ≈ αµ -i.e., the combination of a = 1 and x 2 = 0 is an infrequent event. Yet the rarity is unaccounted for by p R o , which sums over x 2 without conditioning on a (and observe that Pr(x 2 = 0) = αµ + 1 − α > Pr(a = 1, x 2 = 0)). At the same time, the probability of y = 1 conditional on the combination a = 1, x 2 = 0 is approximately one: if we observe both hawkish policy and weak nationalism, it is almost surely because the regime is unstable. The coupling of these two effects leads to an exaggerated belief in the probability of y = 1 conditional on a = 1.
Equilibrium polarization
The marginal equilibrium distribution over policies assigns weight to one policy on each side of the agent's ideal point. The fundamental force behind this polarization effect is a "diminishing returns" property of the two narratives: their ability to deceive the agent about the effect of a on y decreases with the historical frequency of the action they support. Thus, when we perturb α above the equilibrium level, this makes room for the growing popularity of a lever narrative that sustains a dovish policy. Conversely, perturbing α below the equilibrium level increases the popularity of an opportunity narrative that promotes a hawkish policy.
This effect can be interpreted in terms of cross-sectional political polarization: At any moment in time, there are two narrative-policy pairs that dominate public opinion. Alternatively, it can be given an "ergodic" interpretation: Different narrative-policy pairs rise to dominance at different points in time, and the distribution σ captures the long-run frequency with which each of them is dominant.
Mutual narrative refutation
In our model, the representative agent does not reason "scientifically" about the causal models conveyed by conflicting narratives. Rather than actively seeking data about p(y | a) in order to test the contending narratives, he allows the "narrators" to determine the data he pays attention to. Thus, the lever narrative calls his attention to the conditional probabilities p(x 2 | a) and p(y | x 2 ), whereas the opportunity narrative calls his attention to the marginal probability p(x 2 ) and the conditional probability p(y | a, x 2 ). When evaluating a given narrative (p, R), the agent only considers the data that the narrative calls attention to and uses it to evaluate the narrative's anticipatory value, via the factorization formula p R .
If our agent were somewhat less passive in his approach to data, he could notice that the data that one narrative employs actually refutes the other narrative. Thus, the data p(y | a, x 2 ) referred to by the opportunity narrative demonstrates that unlike what the lever narrative assumes, y and a are not independent conditional on x 2 . Conversely, the data p(x 2 | a) demonstrates that unlike what the opportunity narrative assumes, x 2 and a are not independent. But how would the agent respond to this observation? A critical reaction would be to distrust all narratives and develop a more "scientific" belief-formation method. However, an equally natural reaction would be to conclude that "all narratives are wrong" and stick to the one that makes the agent feel more hopeful about the future -especially in the political context, where the agent's personal stakes are negligible.
Finally, note that this scenario would not arise in a modified version of our example, in which there are two distinct variables with the same conditional distribution. In this case, the two conflicting narratives could invoke different variables, such that the above mutual refutation would be infeasible.
Hawkish bias and distortion of the status quo For a given absolute policy distance from the ideal point
, the opportunity narrative leads to a higher anticipatory utility than the lever narrative. As a result, the average equilibrium policy lands on the hawkish side (even . The fundamental reason behind this effect is that given p, the lever narrative has the property that V ((p, R l ), α | α) = µ, whereas the opportunity narrative satisfies V ((p, R l ), α | α) > µ. In other words, while the lever narrative exaggerates the probability of y = 1 under a counterf actual dovish movement away from the steady-state policy, it does not distort the consequences of a policy that adheres to the status quo. In contrast, the opportunity narrative also distorts the status-quo. This ability to spin tales not just about counterfactual events but also about the status quo gives the opportunity narrative an advantage over the lever narrative. A plausible criterion for refining our notion of equilibrium is to rule out such distortions of the status quo because the public is less likely to fall for a narrative that misrepresents the status quo. Our analysis in the next section will involve such a restriction. In the current example, it rules out the opportunity narrative (in fact, this is generically the case).
The following result summarizes the effect of this change on the equilibrium analysis.
Claim 2 Suppose that R includes all the DAGs in the original specification except a → y ← x 2 . Then, there exists an essentially unique equilibrium (α, σ), where α ≈ The proof follows the same outline as in the previous claim, except that the policy d * coupled with any DAG that induces rational expectations (e.g.
. Thus, when the opportunity narrative is ruled out, the equilibrium exhibits a dovish bias, mixing between the rationalexpectations policy d * and a dovish policy that is sustained by the lever narrative.
Analysis
Toward the end of the previous section, we pointed out that while narratives distort the effect of a on y, a plausible restriction is that this distortion only involves counterf actual deviations from the steady-state policy. It is one thing to stoke illusions about the consequences of counterfactual policies, and quite another to present a wrong picture about the consequences of actual policies, because the latter can be checked against the long-run observation of p(y). Hence, it seems sensible to restrict attention to narratives that do not distort beliefs about the effectiveness of the status-quo policy. In this section, we implement this desideratum by restricting the set of feasible DAGs R.
Definition 2 (Perfect DAGs) A DAG (N, R) is perfect if whenever iRk and jRk for some i, j, k ∈ N, it is the case that iRj or jRi.
Thus, in a causal model that is represented by a perfect DAG, if two variables are perceived as direct causes of a third variable, then there must be a perceived direct causal link between them. E.g., 1 → 2 → 3 is perfect, and so is the more elaborate DAG:
In contrast, the DAG 1 → 3 ← 2 is imperfect because 1R3 and 2R3, yet there is no direct link between 1 and 2.
Perfection is a familiar property in the Bayesian Networks literature. In our context, the crucial properties of perfect DAGs are the following:
Correct marginals. Let (N, R) be a perfect DAG. Then, p R (x i ) = p(x i ) for every i ∈ N. That is, the subjective distribution induced by the DAG does not distort the objective marginal distribution over individual variables.
No status-quo distortion (NSQD). Let (N, R) be a perfect DAG. Then, V ((p, R), α | α) = µ for every objective distribution p. That is, the DAG never distorts the consequences of following a policy that coincides with the historical action frequencies.
Indeed, Spiegler (2017 Spiegler ( ,2018 shows that the class of perfect DAGs is the largest that satisfies these properties for all objective distributions. This observation can be extended: For a generic p, imperfect DAGs will violate both properties. Thus, the significance of the restriction to perfect DAGs is that it is necessary for the NSQD property, given a generic set Q.
Linear Narratives
In this sub-section we investigate the structure of narratives. Specifically, we focus on the notion of linear DAGs.
Definition 3 A DAG (N,
Clearly, linear DAGs are a subclass of perfect DAGs, because by definition, no node in a linear DAG has more than one parent. Linear DAGs capture the simplest form of narrative. They consist of a single causal chain and correspond to the notion of stories as "one damned thing after another". In addition, they are simple in the sense that they only call attention to correlations between pairs of variables (this property characterizes any causal tree -indeed, linear DAGs are degenerate trees with a single terminal node).
The intuitive appeal of linear DAGs raises the question of whether there is any loss of generality in restricting attention to them. Formally, we pose the following question. Consider a narrative (p, R) in which R is a perfect DAG. Is there an alternative narrative (p ′ , R ′ ) in which R ′ is linear (and not larger than R, in the sense that it has weakly fewer nodes), such that p
Looking at the illustrative perfect DAGs at the beginning of this section, one might get the impression that the answer is obvious. For instance, in the DAG given by (13), we could collapse the subsets {2, 3} and {4, 5} into a pair of "mega-nodes" x ′ 2 = (x 2 , x 3 ) and x ′ 4 = (x 4 , x 5 ), such that the sixnode perfect DAG, denoted R, would be reduced to a four-node linear DAG
However, note that for a given p, the original DAG R induces
whereas the reduced DAG leads to a factorization that can be written as
The third terms in these two expressions are different. Therefore, for arbitrary p, we will have p R ′ = p R and it is not immediately obvious that we could come up with a different p ′ such that p
Proposition 2 For every narrative (p, R) in which R is perfect, there exists another narrative (p ′ , R ′ ) in which R ′ is linear and has weakly fewer nodes than R, such that p 
Polarization
As shown at the end of Section 2, under rational expectations (or when R only consists of DAGs that induce p R (y = 1 | a) = µ for all a), any equilibrium assigns probability one to the ideal policy d * . This provides a stark benchmark for the result in this sub-section.
Definition 4 Fix µ.
A pair (Q, R) is rich if it satisfies the following two conditions: (i) for every α ∈ (0, 1) there exists a feasible narrative (p, R), p ∈ P α,µ , R ∈ R, such that p R (y = 1 | a) is non-constant in a, and (ii) for every q ∈ Q there exists q ′ ∈ Q such that q ′ (· | a, y) ≡ q(· | 1 − a, y).
Richness means that the set of feasible narratives always enables belief distortions that favor either action. To see why it is not a vacuous property, recall that the lever narrative in Section 3 satisfies p R (y = 1 | a = 0) > p R (y = 1 | a = 1). Because Q is a singleton in that example, it fails condition (ii) in the definition of richness. Now add to Q a mirror image of the conditional distribution given by (6), such that x 2 = (1 − a)(1 − y) with arbitrarily high probability. Then, as long as R includes a → x 2 → y, the pair (Q, R) is rich.
Proposition 3 Let R be a collection of perfect DAGs, such that (Q, R) is rich. Then, in any equilibrium (α, σ), σ assigns positive probability to exactly
Proof. Fix an equilibrium (α, σ). First, we establish that the support of σ must include least two distinct policies. Assume the contrary -i.e., the marginal of σ over d is degenerate. Then by definition, it assigns probability one to the steady-state policy α. By the NSQD property of perfect DAGs, 
By property (i) of richness, there is a feasible narrative (p ′ , R ′ ) such that without loss of generality, p 
Now suppose that the support of σ contains at least two distinct policies. We argue that at least two of these policies, denoted By the definition of equilibrium, any narrative (p, R) that accompanies any d in the support of σ maximizes
where
Because all feasible narratives involve perfect DAGs, any (p, R) must satisfy
This means that we can rewrite V ((p, R), d | α) as follows: Thus, when the set of feasible narratives only involves perfect DAGs -yet is sufficiently rich to enable belief distortion in either direction -equilibrium must induce exactly two policies. Each of the two policies deviates from the ideal point d * in a different direction. As the proof of the result indicates, this polarization result does not directly rely on the notion of narratives as causal models. Indeed, any model of belief distortion that satisfies NSQD and richness would lead to the same result. Causal models only play an indirect role in this sub-section: Perfect DAGs imply NSQD and non-vacuousness of the richness property. They will return to play a direct role in the next sub-section.
Short Narratives
In this sub-section we provide a complete equilibrium characterization for the following specification. First, narratives must be short: They can involve at most one variable x 2 in addition to a and y. Second, R is the set of perfect DAGs with two or three nodes in which a is represented by an ancestral node. The only DAG in this class that does not induce p R (y | a) = µ for all a is the lever DAG a → x 2 → y. Finally, Q is large in the following sense: There is an arbitrarily small constant δ > 0 such that for every conditional distribution (p(x 2 | a, y)), there is a conditional distribution q ∈ Q such that max a,y |q(
Our analysis in the previous sub-section implies that in any equilibrium (α, σ), Supp(σ) consists of two elements: a policy d r > d * sustained by a lever narrative that employs some distribution q r ∈ Q, and a policy d l < d * sustained by another lever narrative that employs a different distribution
The following result refines this characterization.
Proposition 4
There is an essentially unique equilibrium (α, σ). 3 In particular:
(i) In the δ → 0 limit, q r is defined by p(x 2 = 1 | a, y) = y + a(1 − y) and q l is defined by p(
, and α = 1 2
Proof. We established in the previous sub-section that d r is accompanied by a narrative (p, R) that maximizes p R (y = 1 | a = 1); and likewise, d l is accompanied by a narrative (p, R) that maximizes p R (y = 1 | a = 0). The only DAG that can induce non-constant p R (y | a) is a → x 2 → y. Therefore, the narratives that accompany both d r and d l involve this DAG, which we denote by R. To find the optimal narrative that accompanies d r , we need to find the quadruple (p(x 2 = 1 | a, y)) a,y=0,1 that maximizes
In the Appendix, we show that the solution in the δ → 0 limit is p
and, by NSQD,
Likewise, the narrative that accompanies d l in the δ → 0 limit involves the conditional distribution p * * (
Denote ∆ = |d − α|, e = α − d * . Then, we can write
Recall that by assumption,
and e > 0. It is then clear from (16) that U r (α) < U l (α), contradicting equilibrium. Now suppose α < 1 2 . Then, e < 0, and it is clear from (16) 
since U r (α) is strictly decreasing in α while U l (α) is strictly increasing in α, there is at most one value of α for which U r (α) = U l (α), hence equilibrium must be unique.
The characterization has a number of noteworthy properties. First, the lever narrative that sustains either of the two equilibrium policies selects the intermediate variable x 2 such that it is highly correlated with both the desired outcome y = 1 and the advocated policy. Specifically, the selected variable is such that one particular value is attained whenever y = 1 or the favored action is taken.
For illustration, recall the US trade policy debate described in the Introduction. In this context, our characterization approximates the following prevailing narratives. The lever narrative that sustains a policy with a protectionist bias (relative to the agent's ideal point) will involve a variable like "imports from China", because low imports are associated with trade restrictions as well as with high employment in the local manufacturing sector, even if the latter correlation is not causal but due to a confounding factor (such as exogenous technology changes that affect outsourcing of production). Likewise, the lever narrative that sustains a trade policy with a liberalized bias will select a variable like "industrial exports".
Second, the anticipatory utility induced by the equilibrium narratives exhibits a diminishing-returns property. That is, when α increases (decreases), the narrative that advocates right-leaning (left-leaning) policies has lower anticipatory value. This property is intuitive: narratives generate false hopes about counterfactual policies; as the historical action frequency leans in the same direction as the narrative, the ability to sell this illusion diminishes. In turn, the diminishing-returns property implies two features of equilibrium: essential uniqueness (specifically, the marginal equilibrium distribution over policies is unique) and a "centrist bias" (i.e., the historical action frequency lies between 1 2 and d * .
Opportunity Narratives
Our analysis in the previous section ruled out imperfect DAGs, which include the opportunity narrative we encountered in Section 3. In this section we explore the implication of allowing for imperfect DAGs. We focus our analysis on the case in which only a single auxiliary variable can be used (i.e., n = 3). Thus, the set of feasible DAGs is the set of all DAGs with up to three nodes, in which a is represented by an ancestral node. The only imperfect DAG in this class is a → x 2 ← y. We assume throughout that d * = Proof. Assume the contrary -without loss of generality, there is an equilibrium (α, σ) that assigns probability one to policies
. Therefore,
. If the DAG a → y ← x 2 is never played in this equilibrium, we are back with the model of Section 4.2, where this possibility was ruled out. Now suppose that Supp(σ) includes a narrative-policy pair ((p, R), d) in which R : a → y ← x 2 . Let us first establish that, for one such pair, p R (y = 1 | a = 1) = p R (y = 1 | a = 0) . Assume the contrary for every such (p, R).
This means that if we switched to the DAG R ′ : y ← x 2 , we would have
all a. This means that the narrative-policy pair ((p, R), d) induces the same net anticipatory utility as if the narrative involved the DAG a → y. Since we can perform this substitution for every narrative-policy pair in Supp(σ)
that involves the DAG a → y ← x 2 , we are back in the case of Section 4.2, which again leads to a contradiction. From now on, assume without loss of generality that for every narrative- and Supp(σ) includes a narrative-policy pair ((p, R), d) in
and p R (y = 1 | a = 1) > p R (y = 1 | a = 0). Write down the explicit formula for p R (y | a):
For a = 1, this expression becomes
And since p R (y = 1 | a = 1) > µ, A > 1. The net anticipatory utility generated by ((p, R), α) can thus be written as
Now consider a deviation to the narrative-policy pair ((p, R),
That is,p is a mirror image of p. By assumption,p is feasible. DefineÃ andB accordingly. By construction,Ã = B andB = A. Therefore, the net anticipatory utility generated by ((p, R),
and A > 1, this expression exceeds (18), a contradiction.
Unlike the case of perfect DAGs, the DAG a → x 2 ← y does not satisfy the NSQD property, and therefore the proof resorts to other arguments. The key question is whether, assuming all equilibrium policies lie on one side
, a narrative-policy pair ((p, a → x 2 ← y), d) ∈ Supp(σ) can be destabilized by a deviation to a "mirror" pair. The answer is not obvious, and our proof relies on the particular structure of the imperfect three-node DAG a → x 2 ← y.
The result is weaker than its analogue in Section 4.2. In particular, we are unable to determine whether equilibrium will sustain exactly one policy on each side of d * for general cost functions. However, when costs are sufficiently small, we obtain a stronger characterization.
Proposition 6 Suppose (as in Section 4.3) that there is an arbitrarily small constant δ > 0 such that for every conditional distribution (p(x 2 | a, y)) there is q ∈ Q such that max a,y |q( Proof. In Section 4.3, we derived, for each a = 0, 1, a lever narrative that sustains p R (y = 1 | a) − p R (y = 1 | 1 − a) > 0 for any given α ∈ (0, 1).
Since this difference is the derivative of V with respect to d, it follows that if C ′ is sufficiently small, the only policies that survive in equilibrium are the extreme points d = 1 − ε and d = ε. It follows that in order to characterize equilibrium in the low ε limit, we only need to look for the narratives (p, R) that maximize p R (y = 1 | a) for each a = 0, 1.
In Section 4.3, we saw that the largest p R (y = 1 | a = 1) and p R (y = 1 | a = 0) that lever narratives can attain are µ/[µ + (1 − µ)α] and µ/[µ + (1 − µ)(1 − α)], respectively. In the Appendix, we show that the largest p R (y = 1 | a = 1) and p R (y = 1 | a = 0) that opportunity narratives can attain are 1−α(1−µ) and 1−(1−α)(1−µ), respectively. A simple calculation
for any α ∈ (0, 1). It follows that the prevailing narrative-policy pairs in any equilibrium in the ε, δ → 0 limit are as described in the statement of the proposition. In equilibrium, these pairs must deliver the same net anticipatory utility:
which holds if and only if α = Thus, when the set of feasible three-node DAGs is unrestricted, the set Q is rich and the cost C is low, the narratives that prevail in equilibrium are opportunity narratives and they sustain extreme policies. Surprisingly, the opportunity narrative that sustains an extreme right (left) policy employs the same third variable that was employed by the equilibrium lever narrative that sustained the extreme left (right) in Section 4.3. We saw an inkling of this effect in the illustrative example of Section 3: The same variable can feature in narratives that support radically different policies; what changes is the role that this variable plays in the narrative's causal structure.
Conclusion
The model presented in this paper formalized a number of intuitions regarding the role of narratives in the formation of popular political opinions. Our model was based on two main ideas.
What are narratives and how do they shape beliefs? In our model, narratives are formalized as causal models (represented by DAGs) that describe how actions map into consequences. Different narratives employ different intermediate variables and arrange them differently in the causal scheme. Narratives shape beliefs in the sense that beliefs emerge from fitting causal models to long-run correlations between the variables that appear in the narrative. These beliefs are used to evaluate policies.
How does the public select between competing narratives? Our behavioral assumption was that in the presence of conflicting narrative-policy pairs, the public (a representative agent in this paper) selects between them "hedonically" -i.e., according to the anticipatory utility induced by each of these pairs. This is consistent with the basic intuition that people are drawn to "hopeful" stories.
The main insights that emerged as results of our formalism can be summarized as follows. First, narratives are employed to "sell false hopes": They involve misspecified causal models that generate biased beliefs regarding the consequences of counterfactual policies. Second, the same variable can serve two conflicting narratives with a different causal structure (e.g., "lever narrative" vs. "opportunity narrative") in the service of conflicting policies. Third, multiplicity of dominant narrative-policy pairs can be a fundamental property of long-run equilibrium in the "battle over public opinion". Indeed, growing popularity of one policy can strengthen the appeal of a narrative that supports an opposing policy. This "diminishing returns" property leads to additional properties of equilibrium (uniqueness, centrist bias) in specific settings. Finally, when we rule out narratives that convey false beliefs regarding the status quo, linear narratives are without loss of generality.
Our analysis leaves a number of open technical problems. First, Section 4.3 provided a complete equilibrium characterization for perfect DAGs and rich Q in the case of n = 3. We also know that for n = 4, equilibrium narratives have the longer linear form a → x 2 → x 3 → y. Naturally, we conjecture that for general n, prevailing narratives are linear chains of length n. But what are the conditional beliefs over consequences that these prevailing narratives induce? Finally, the case of general n and an unrestricted set of feasible DAGs (including imperfect ones) is almost entirely open; the only analysis we have been able to carry out for this domain is the n = 3 example of Section 4. A broad question that is common to these two cases is whether our definition of equilibrium generates a force that favors narratives that involve many variables.
and β denotes an element in this space. Observe that when we fix α and µ, an element q ∈ Q induces unambiguously an element p q ∈ P α,µ .
The payoff of player 1 from the strategy profile (α, β) is
Note that since p R is a continuous function of α, so is U. The payoff of player 2 from (σ, α) is
A Nash equilibrium in this auxiliary game is equivalent to our notion of equilibrium. The strategy spaces and payoff functions of the two players in the auxiliary game satisfy standard conditions for the existence of Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds in the three main steps.
Step 1: Deriving an auxiliary "clique factorization" formula Consider a non-linear perfect DAG (N, R), where N = {1, ..., n}, n > 2. We say that a subset of nodes C ⊆ N is a clique if for every i, j ∈ C, iRj or jRi. We say that a clique is maximal if it is not contained in another clique. Let C be the collection of maximal cliques in the DAG.
The following is standard material in the Bayesian-Networks literature. Because (N, R) is perfect, we can construct an auxiliary (non-directed) tree whose set of nodes is C, such that for every pair of nodes C and C ′ in this tree, C ∩ C ′ is contained in any C ′′ that lies along the path that connects C and C ′ (the path is unique, by the definition of a tree). Such a tree is referred to in the literature as a junction tree. Given a junction tree, we say that S ⊆ N is a separator if there are two adjacent tree nodes C and C ′ such that S = C ∩ C ′ . Let S be the set of separators for a given junction tree constructed from C. Then, for any distribution p ′ ∈ ∆(X) with full support that is consistent with (N, R) (i.e., in the sense that p R = p),
For an exposition of these results, see Cowell et al. (1999) , pp. 52-69. Now, our objective distribution p is not necessarily consistent with R.
However, p R is consistent with R by definition. Furthermore, a key feature of perfect DAGs is that they do not distort the marginal distributions over cliques -i.e., p R (x C ) ≡ p(x C ) for every C ∈ C (see Spiegler (2017) for further details). It follows that for every objective distribution p and a perfect DAG (N, R), we can write
where C is the set of maximal cliques in (N, R) and S is the set of separators in some junction tree constructed out of C. Let C 1 , C m ∈ C be two cliques in (N, R) that include the nodes 1 and n, respectively. Furthermore, for a given junction tree representation of the DAG, select these cliques to be minimally distant from each other -i.e., 1, n / ∈ C for every C along the junction-tree path between C 1 and C m . If C 1 = C m , then by our earlier observation that perfect DAGs do not distort the marginals of collections of variables that form a clique, it follows that p R (x 1 , x n ) ≡ p(x 1 , x n ) and therefore p R (x n | x 1 ) ≡ p(x n | x 1 ) -i.e. we can replace the original DAG with the degenerate linear DAG 1 → n and obtain the same subjective conditional distribution over x n . The same deviation holds if there is no junction-tree path between C 1 and C m , because this means that x 1 ⊥ x n according to p R , and therefore
Thus, from now on, assume that C 1 = C m and there is a junction-tree path between C 1 and C m . Enumerate all the nodes in the junction tree and turn it into a directed tree, such that C 1 is its root node. For every k = 2, ..., |C|, let pa(k) denote the index of the direct parent of C k -i.e. the junction tree has a direct link C pa(k) → C k . In particular, let C 1 , C 2 , ..., C m be the tree nodes along the path between C 1 and C m , such that this path is C 1 → C 2 → · · · → C m . By the definition of a junction tree, if i ∈ C k , C j for some 1 ≤ k < j ≤ m, then i ∈ C h for every h = k + 1, ..., j − 1. And since the cliques C 1 , ..., C m are maximal, it follows that every C k along the sequence C 0 , ..., C m+1 must introduce at least one element i / ∈ ∪ j<k C j . As a result, it must be the case that m ≤ n − 1. Now, repeatedly apply the identity
to (19) for every k ≥ 2, and obtain the following equivalent formula:
Furthermore, by the definition of the junction tree, for every k > m, C k − C pa(k) and C * = C 1 ∪ · · · ∪ C m are mutually disjoint. Therefore,
Step 2: Obtaining a linear-DAG factorization We begin this step by deriving the subjective conditional probability p R (x n | x 1 ) from (20). Recall that from the definition of C 1 and C m it follows that 1 ∈ C 1 , n ∈ C m , and 1, n / ∈ C k for every k = 2, ..., m − 1. Denote C 0 = {1} and observe that p(
We can draw an immediate conclusion from this formula. Suppose that there is some i ∈ C * − {1, n} such that i ∈ C k for a unique k = 1, ..., m. Then, the variable x i appears in only one term in (21), namely p(x C k −C k−1 | x C k ∩C k−1 ). Moreover, by assumption, i ∈ C k −C k−1 . Therefore, we can rewrite this term as follows:
This means we can rewrite p R (x n | x 1 ) as follows:
This is the same formula we would have if we removed i (and the links associated with this node) from the original DAG in the first place. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can assume that every i ∈ C * − {1, n} belongs to at least two cliques C k , k = 1, ..., m. Furthermore, by the definition of a junction tree, these two cliques are consecutive, C k and C k+1 . In particular, this means that C 1 −C 2 = {1}, C m −C m−1 = {n}, and C k −C k−1 ⊆ C k+1 ∩C k for every k = 1, ..., m − 1. The latter observation implies that for every This DAG has at most m + 1 ≤ n nodes.
Step 3 The expression in the large parenthesis can be written as
This is the only place in the formula for p R (y|a) where z k makes an appearance. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can transform z k into a binary variable that gets the value 1 when z k = z * k and the value 0 when z k = z * k . The distribution p ′ over a, y and the other m − 2 binary variables is thus derived from p via the above series of steps. The requirement that p ′ has full support is therefore satisfied because z k gets at least two values. 
Note that this expression is a convex combination of two expressions, and p 01 = p 11 = p 10 = 1, p 00 = 0 attain this upper bound.
